The problem of approximating a propositional calculus is t o find many-valued logics which are sound for the calculus (i.e., all theorems of the calculus are tautologies) with as few tautologies as possible. This has potential applications f o r representing (computationally complex) logics used in A I by (computationally easy) many-valued logics. It is investigated how f a r this method can be carried using (1) one or (2) an infinite sequence of many-valued logics. It is shown that the optimal candidate matrices f o r (1) can be computed from the calculus.
Introduction
The question of what to do when face to face with a new logical calculus is an age-old problem of mathematical logic. One usually has, at least at first, no semantics. For example, intuitionistic propositional logic was constructed by Heyting only as a calculus; semantics for it were proposed much later. Currently we face a similar situation with Girard's linear logic. The lack of semantical methods makes it difficult to answer questions such as: Are statements of a certain form (un)derivable? Are the axioms independent? Is the calculus consistent? For logics closed under substitution many-valued methods have often proved valuable since they were first used for proving underivabilities by Bernays [2] in 1926 (and later by others, e.g., McKinsey and Wajsberg; see also [12, f 251). For the above-mentioned underivability question it is necessary to find many-valued matrices for which the given calculus is sound. If a formula is not a tautology under such a matrix, it cannot be derivable in the calculus. 
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It is also necessary, of course, that the matrix has as few tautologies as possible in order to be useful.
Such "optimal" approximations of a given calculus may also have applications in computer science. In the field of artificial intelligence many new (propositional) logics have been introduced. They are usually better suited to model the problems dealt with in AI than traditional (classical, intuitionistic, or modal) logics, but many have two significant drawbacks: First, they are either given solely semantically or solely by a calculus. For practical purposes, a proof theory is necessary; otherwise computer representation of and automated search for proofs/truths in these logics is not feasible. Second, most of them are intractable, and hopelessly so, provided the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse. For instance, many nonmonotonic formalisms have been shown to be hard for classes above NP [5] . Although satisfiability in many-valued propositional logics is (as in classical logic) NP-complete [ll], this is still (probably) much better.
On the other hand, it is evident from the work of Carnielli [3] and Hahnle [8] on tableaux, and Rousseau, Takahashi, and Baaz et al. [l] on sequents, that finite-valued logics are, from the perspective of proof and model theory, very close to classical logic. Therefore, many-valued logic is a very suitable candidate if one looks for approximations, in some sense, of given complex logics.
What is needed are methods for obtaining finitevalued approximations of the propositional logics at hand. It turns out, however, that a shift of emphasis is in order here. While it is the logic we are actually interested in, we always are given only a representation of the logic. Hence, we have to concentrate on approximations of the representation, and not of the logic per se.
What is a representation of a logic? The first type of representation that comes to mind is a calculus. Hilbert-type calculi are the simplest conceptually and the oldest historically. We will investigate the relationship between such calculi on the one hand and many-valued logics or recursive sequences of manyvalued logics on the other hand. The latter notion has received considerable attention in the literature in the form of the following two problems: Given a calculus C , find a minimal (finite) normal matrix for C (relevant for non-derivability and independence proofs), and find a sequence of finite-valued logics whose intersection equals the theorems of C , and its converse, given a sequence of finite-valued logics, find a calculus for its intersection (exemplified by Jdkowski's sequence for intuitionistic propositional calculus, and by Dummett's extension axiomatizing the intersection of the sequence of Godel logics, respectively).
(l), of course, the best case would be a finitevalued logic M whose tautologies coincide with the theorems of C. C then provides an axiomatization of M. This of course is not always possible, at least for finite-valued logics. Lindenbaum [lo, Satz 31 has shown that any logic (in our sense, given by a set of rules and closed under substitution) can be characterized by an infinitevalued logic. For a discussion of related questions see also Rescher [12, f 241.
In the following we will consider these questions in a general setting. Consider a propositional Hilberttype calculus C. First of all, an optimal (i.e., minimal under set inclusion of the tautologies) m-valued logic for which C satisfies reasonable soundness properties can be computed. We call such a logic normal for C. The next question is, can we find an approximating sequence of m-valued logics in the sense of (2)? It is shown that this is impossible for undecidable calculi C, and possible for all decidable logics closed under substitution. (1) propositional variables: XO, X I , X z , . . . , Xj, . . . Formulas and subformulas are defined as usual.
We denote the set of formulas over a language L by Frm(L). By Var(A) we mean the set of propositional variables occurring in A. If F is a theorem of C we write C I -F . The set of theorems of C is denoted by Thm(C). A formula F is a tautology of M iff it is satisfied by every valuation. Then we write M F. We denote the set of tautologies of M by Taut(M). In the remaining sections, we will concentrate on the relations between calculi C, logics L, and manyvalued logics M . The objective is to find many-valued logics M (or sequences thereof) that, in a sense, approximate the calculus C and/or the logic L.
The following well-known product construction is useful for characterizing the "intersection" of manyvalued logics. 
, and truth functions are defined component-wise. I.e., if 0 is an n-ary connective, then
The definition and lemma are easily generalized to the case of finite products ni Mi by induction.
When looking for a logic with as small a number of truth values as possible which falsifies a given formula we can use the following construction. Proof.
We first prove the proposition for n = 1. Let I be the interpretation in M making A1 false, and let B1, . . . , B, ([(AI) = T + 1) be all subformulas of A l . Every Bi has a truth value t; in I. Let M' be as follows:
This sequence of logics was used in [6] to show that intuitionistic logic cannot be characterized by a finite matrix.
in M', hence M' A l .
(1) Since tr was undesignated in M, it is also undesignated in M'. But I is also a truth value assignment (2) Let C be a tautology of M , and let J be an interpretation in M'. If no subformula of C evaluates to T under J , then J is also an interpretation in M, and C takes the same truth value in M' as in M w.r.t. J , which is designated also in M'. Otherwise, C evaluates to T, which is designated in M'. So C is a tautology in M'.
(3) Obvious.
For n > 1, the proposition follows by taking @(My AI, . . . , A n ) = ny='=, @(My Ai) 3 
Many-valued Covers for Calculi
We are looking for many-valued logics M s.t. Thm(C) Taut(M). M must, however, behave "normally" with respect to C , i.e., C must remain sound whenever we add new operators and their truth tables to M or add tautologies as axioms to C. M is then called a cover for C.
We would like to stress the distinction between strong soundness, a.k.a. normality, and soundness. The latter is the familiar property of a calculus to produce only valid formulas as theorems. This "plain" soundness is what we actually would like to investigate in terms of approximations. More precisely, when looking for a finite-valued logic that approximates a given calculus, we are content if we find a logic for which C is sound. It is, however, not possible in general to test if a calculus is sound for a given finite-valued logic. It is possible to test if it is strongly sound. For this pragmatic reason we consider only normal matrices for the given calculi. The next proposition characterizes the normal matrices in terms of strong soundness conditions. These are reasonable conditions which one expects to hold of a "normal" matrix. 
PROPOSITION It is decidable if a given propositional calculus is strongly sound for a given m-valued logic.
Note also that for usual calculi, Property (*) is relatively easy to check. For instance, modus ponens is strongly sound iff, whenever A is true, A 3 B is true iff B is true; necessitation is strongly sound if O X is true whenever X is true. for 0 E { i , > , A , V}. Neither IPC nor LJ are strongly sound for GL, but LJ without cut is. In fact, every formula of the form o k X G X is falsified in some M,.
Optimal Covers
By Proposition 3.4 it is decidable if a given mvalued logic M is a cover of C . Since we can enumerate all m-valued logics, we can also find all covers of C . Moreover, comparing two many-valued logics as to their sets of tautologies is decidable, as the next theorem will show. Using this result, we see that we can always generate optimal covers for L. We show this by giving an upper bound on the depth of a minimal formula A satisfying the above property. Since the set of formulas of L is enumerable, bounded search will produce such a formula iff it exists. Note that the property (*) is decidable by enumerating all assignments. In the following, let m = max(m1, mz).
Let A be a formula that satisfies (*), i.e., there is a valuation I s.t. I~M~A .
W.1.o.g. we can assume that A contains at most m different variables: if it contained more, some of them must be evaluated to the same truth value in the counterexample I for M1 k A.
Unifying these variables leaves (*) intact. 
I f f ( & ) = f ( B j ) and t ( B i ) = t ( B j ) , replace
Bi in A with Bj. A' is shorter than A , and it still satisfies (*). By iterating this construction until no two subformulas have the desired property we obtain a formula A*. This procedure terminates, since A' is shorter than A; it preserves (*), since A' remains a tautology under Mz (we replace subformulas behaving in exactly the same way under all valuations) and the countermodel I is also a countermodel for A'.
The depth of A* is bounded above by m"+l -1. 
Proof.
Mz nor M2 a* MI.
Taut(M1) = Taut 
Sequential Approximations
In the previous section we have shown that it is always possible to obtain the best m-valued covers of a given calculus, but there is no way to tell how good these covers are. In this section, we investigate the relation between sequences of many-valued logics and the set of theorems of a calculus C . Such sequences are called sequential approximations of C if they verify all theorems and refute all non-theorems of C . Put another way, this is a question about the limitations of Bernays' method. On the negative side an immediate result says that calculi for undecidable logics do not have sequential approximations. If, however, a propositional logic is decidable, it also has a sequential approximation (independent of a calculus).
5.1. DEFINITION Let C be a calculus and let A = (Ml,Mz,M3, . . ., Mj,. . .) ( j E U ) be a sequence of many-valued logics s.t.
(1) A is given by a recursive procedure, We say C is approximable, if there is such a sequential approximation for C.
Condition (2) above is technically not necessary. Approximating sequences of logics in the literature (see next example), however, satisfy this condition. Furthermore, with the emphasis on "approximation," it seems more natural that the sequence gets successively "better." Taut(Gi) is the set of tautologies of the infinitevalued Godel logic GN, which is axiomatized by the rules of I P C plus the above formula. This has been shown in [4] (see also [7, 3.41) . Hence, G is a sequential approximationof GN = IPC+(A 2 B)V(B 2 A).
Jdkowski [9] gave a sequential approximation of IPC.
The natural question to ask is: Which calculi are approximable? First we give the unsurprising negative answer for undecidable calculi. 
Conclusion
The main open problem, especially in view of possible applications in computer science, is the complexity of the computation of optimal covers. One would expect that it is tractable at least for some reasonable classes of calculi which are syntactically characterizable, e.g., analytic calculi.
A second problem is in how far approximations can be found for first-order logics and calculi. One obstacle, for instance, is that it is difficult to check whether a matrix is normal for a given calculus, in particular if the rules of the calculus are not "monadic" in the sense that they manipulate more than one variable at a time. In any case, a systematic treatment only seems feasible for many-valued logics with, at most, distribution quantifiers [3] .
